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We explore heterogeneities in the determinants of innovating firms’ decisions to engage in R&D
cooperation, differentiating between four types of cooperation partners: competitors, suppliers,
customers, and universities and research institutes (institutional cooperation). We use two matched
waves of the Dutch Community Innovation Survey (in 1996 and 1998) and apply system probit
estimation. We find that determinants of R&D cooperation differ significantly across cooperation
types. The positive impact of firm size, R&D intensity, and incoming source-specific spillovers is
weaker for competitor cooperation, reflecting greater appropriability concerns. Institutional
spillovers are more generic in nature and positively impact all cooperation types. The results appear
robust to potential simultaneity bias.
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The growing role of R&D collaboration in firms’ innovative activities (Hagedoorn,
2002) has spurred research into the determinants of R&D cooperation and the effects of
cooperative R&D. Two major strands of theoretical literature can be distinguished. The
Industrial Organization (IO) literature has extensively examined the incentives and welfare
effects of R&D cooperation among competing firms, focusing on the role of R&D
investments and R&D spillovers. Theoretical contributions in the management literature
have stressed that R&D collaboration aims at minimizing transaction costs and exploiting
complementary know-how between partner firms (e.g. Kogut, 1988; Das and Teng, 2000).
Empirical work on R&D cooperation has utilized micro-level survey data from the
European Community Innovation Surveys (CIS), and has focused mainly on the impact of
firm size and R&D intensity as determinants of cooperation (Becker and Dietz, 2002;
Leiponen, 2001; Kaiser, 2002; Veugelers, 1997).
Most of the existing literature does not distinguish R&D cooperation by type of
partner (e.g. competitors, suppliers, clients, universities) but instead aggregates over
R&D cooperation types, with some notable recent exceptions. Kaiser (2002) distin-
guishes between vertical cooperation (cooperation with suppliers and customers) and a
mix of other R&D partnerships in analyzing cooperative R&D by German service firms.
Cassiman and Veugelers (2002), using CIS-I data on Belgian firms in 1994, distinguished
between university–firm cooperation and cooperation with vertically related partners, but
did not consider cooperation with competitors. Fritsch and Lukas (2001) differentiate
cooperation by type of partner to focus on the impact of firm size and R&D intensity on
the propensity to cooperate among German manufacturing firms. Tether (2002)
distinguishes suppliers, customers, competitors, universities and consultants in his
sample of UK CIS-II firms. Leiponen (2001) considers cooperation with competitors,
customers, suppliers and universities using 1997 CIS data for Finnish manufacturing
firms. These studies have in common that they only had cross-section data at their
disposal and hence have grappled with the problem of a simultaneous relationship
between R&D cooperation and R&D intensity and spillovers. Another feature of these
studies is that they have treated the different cooperation strategies as independent, not
taking into account possible correlations between the strategies that could be due to
complementarities.
In this paper we consider heterogeneity in R&D cooperation by exploring differences
in the determinants of innovating firms’ decisions to establish different types of
cooperation: with competitors (horizontal), with suppliers or customers (vertical), and
with universities and research institutes (dinstitutionalT cooperation). We take into
account a broad set of possible explanatory variables, but we concentrate particularly on
the impact of different types of spillovers, a central focus in the industrial organization
literature. Furthermore, while previous studies have investigated the propensity to
establish different types of R&D partnerships in separate models, we allow for possible
correlations between R&D cooperation strategies, by applying a system method of
estimation for dichotomous variables. In addition, we are able to limit simultaneity bias
by employing lagged explanatory variables utilizing two waves of Dutch CIS surveys in
1996 and 1998. We further check the robustness of the results to potential simultaneity
R. Belderbos et al. / Int. J. Ind. Organ. 22 (2004) 1237–1263 1239bias by estimating a model limiting the analysis to firms that had no R&D cooperation
in 1996, examining the determinants of the propensity to establish new cooperation
agreements in 1998.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a brief
overview of the theoretical and empirical literature on R&D cooperation. Section 3
explains the empirical model used and describes the dataset. Section 4 presents the results
and Section 5 concludes.2. R&D cooperation: theoretical and empirical models
2.1. Theoretical models
Models that seek to answer the questions why and what kinds of firms seek to perform
joint research activities are grounded in several theoretical approaches. We will first review
the Industrial Organization (IO) literature, after which we briefly discuss relevant literature
in the domains of management and technology (policy).
The IO literature has focused on the relationship between two kinds of spillovers and
R&D cooperation. On the one hand, there are measures of the importance of external
information flows for the firm’s innovation process. These are incoming spillovers. On the
other hand, firms attempt to appropriate the benefits of their innovations by controlling
information flows out of the company. These are outgoing spillovers. Spillovers can refer
to both involuntary leakage and voluntary transfers of knowledge between market
participants. When spillovers are considered to be at least partly voluntary, firms that are
partners in R&D cooperation can improve on incoming knowledge transfer through
information sharing (Kamien et al., 1992; Katsoulacos and Ulph, 1998). In most
theoretical models of R&D cooperation, incoming and outgoing spillovers are treated as
symmetric and exogenous to the firm. When anticipated, voluntary or involuntary transfers
of know-how complicate cooperative R&D strategies in a non-trivial way (e.g. Spence,
1984; Katz, 1986; D’Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988; De Bondt and Veugelers, 1991;
Kamien et al., 1992; Suzumura, 1992; Vonortas, 1994; De Bondt, 1996; Leahy and Neary,
1997; Katsoulacos and Ulph, 1998). A finding in most models is that spillovers increase
the relative profitability of R&D cooperation once spillovers are sufficiently high, i.e.
beyond a critical level (De Bondt and Veugelers, 1991). On the other hand, models
considering free riding problems in joint ventures have found that higher spillovers also
increase the incentives to cheat by partner firms and the profits from free-riding by
outsiders to the cooperative agreement (Kesteloot and Veugelers, 1995; Eaton and
Eswaran, 1997). These results emphasize a dual role of spillovers: outgoing spillovers may
jeopardize the cooperative agreement while incoming spillovers increase the attractiveness
of cooperation.
More recent IO models take into account that firms can attempt to manage spillovers,
trying to minimize outgoing spillovers while at the same time maximizing incoming
spillovers (Cassiman et al., 2002; Martin, 2002; Amir et al., 2003). Firms can increase the
effectiveness of incoming spillovers by investing in babsorptive capacityQ. Cohen and
Levinthal (1989) show that external knowledge is more effective for the innovation
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investments in internal R&D efforts thus increases the effectiveness of incoming
information. In addition, the choice of research approach by the firm influences the
appropriability conditions it faces and the extent of incoming spillovers it enjoys. Kamien
and Zang (2000) derive a model in which firms that cooperatively choose their R&D
expenditures seek to maximize information flows (their incoming spillovers) by choosing
broader research directions for the research joint venture.
IO research on R&D cooperation has paid little attention to the different types of
potential partners. It has typically considered horizontal cooperation, i.e. between
competing firms, stressing the importance of the degree of product market competition.
When firms are not direct competitors but market independent or complementary goods,
cooperation is associated with higher R&D investment levels independent of any critical
level of spillovers (De Bondt et al., 1992; Ro¨ller et al., 1997). In such a setting where firms
are less direct competitors, joint R&D and possible cheating have no detrimental effect in
terms of strengthening the product market position of the rival. A similar logic holds for
inter-industry cooperation with firms in unrelated markets (Steurs, 1995) and vertical
cooperation with suppliers (Atallah, 2002), although in the latter type of cooperation
commercially sensitive information may also leak out to competitors through common
suppliers or customers.
The management literature typically analyzes cooperation from a transaction costs and
resource-based framework (Tyler and Steensma, 1995). The transaction cost approach
describes alliances as a hybrid form of organization combining aspects of hierarchical
transactions within the firm and arm’s-length transactions in the market place. Cooperation
may reduce transaction costs through a better control and monitoring of technology
transfer than on arm’s length markets, while the inherent reciprocal relationship and
bhostageQ exchange between partners with complementary capabilities can minimize
opportunism (e.g. Pisano, 1990; Hennart, 1988). The resource-based view of the firm
suggests that the rationale for partnerships is the value-creation potential of pooling firms’
resource bases. Cooperation is viewed as a mechanism to maximize firm value through
effectively combining the resources of the partners by exploiting complementarities
(Kogut, 1988; Das and Teng, 2000; Hagedoorn et al., 2000).
The management literature further provides helpful insights to pinpoint different
motives and problems for R&D cooperation with different types of partners. The
importance of lead customers in helping to define innovations and, therefore, to reduce the
risk associated with their market introduction, has already been long recognized (Von
Hippel, 1988; Schmookler, 1966). This provides a major motive for cooperation with
customers in the development of particularly novel or complex new products (Tether,
2002). The goal of vertical cooperation with suppliers has been linked more to cost
reduction, related to the tendency of firms to focus on core competences, outsource
activities to suppliers and/or develop close collaborative arrangements with suppliers to
reduce costs.11 See also Atallah (2002). Suzuki (1993) finds that collaboration with suppliers within Japanese vertical
business groups has a significant impact on cost reduction.
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universities and industry has intensified (e.g. Hall et al., 2000). Firms look for public
science as one of the external sources for rapid and privileged access to new
knowledge and to increase the firms’ engineers understanding of scientific develop-
ments. Science is more important as source of information for innovation in those
science-based technology fields where new breakthrough innovations can be achieved
and transferred to applied research and translated into new products and processes (e.g.
Klevorick et al., 1995). In particular, when coupled with the available public funding
opportunities, cooperation arrangements with academia are increasingly seen as an
inexpensive source of specialist knowledge. Furthermore, the more generic nature of
research projects with universities and research institutes involves fewer appropriation
issues as compared to the more commercially sensitive content when cooperating in
later development stages with customers/suppliers and—a fortiori—competitors (Cassi-
man and Veugelers, 2002).
In summary, the IO literature suggests that spillovers increase incentives to cooperate
in particular if cooperation allows firms to enhance knowledge transfers among the
collaborating partners. However, if incoming spillovers are associated with outgoing
spillovers they have a more ambiguous effect on competitor collaboration as
collaborating product market rivals benefit more from a firm’s R&D effort. These
appropriability considerations are much less important for vertical (supplier, customer)
and institutional collaboration. Firms that increase their absorptive capacity through
larger R&D investments are more likely to benefit from cooperation. In case of
competitor cooperation, higher R&D investments lead to a greater pool of know-how on
which the partner firms can potentially free-ride. The management literature indicates
that different R&D partnerships may be engaged in for different purposes, with customer
cooperation more focused on bringing to market adapted or improved products, supplier
cooperation more focused on cost reduction, and university cooperation focused on new
generic technologies and product families in sectors with greater technological
opportunities.
2.2. Empirical research
There is an expanding empirical literature on the determinants of R&D cooperation.
Given the difficulties in empirically assessing the profitability of R&D cooperation, most
studies indirectly focus on explaining the frequency of occurrence of R&D cooperation to
assess which characteristics are more beneficial to R&D cooperation.2 Product
complementarities among partners are found to positively affect the likelihood of R&D
cooperation (Ro¨ller et al., 1997). Sakakibara (1997) finds that access to complementary
knowledge is one of the most important objectives of establishing government sponsored
research cooperations in Japan. This is in line with Narula’s (2002) finding that access to
complementary technology has the highest importance among motives for R&D2 See e.g. Monjon and Waelbroeck (2003) for a cross section analysis of the impact of different types of R&D
cooperation on firm innovativeness.
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share cost and risks is important for the success of R&D cooperation. Fritsch and Lukas
(2001), Ro¨ller et al. (1997) and Colombo and Garrone (1996) show a positive impact of
firm size and R&D intensity of firms on R&D cooperation. This is reminiscent of the
absorptive capacity idea that stresses the need to have in-house (technological) knowledge
to optimally benefit from R&D cooperation.3 Another line of empirical research has
specifically taken into account the simultaneous relationship between R&D cooperation
and in-house R&D activities. These studies have generally confirmed that, controlling for
this simultaneity, internal R&D investments still have a positive impact on the probability
or intensity of cooperation (Colombo and Garrone, 1996; Veugelers, 1997; Cassiman and
Veugelers, 2002; Becker and Dietz, 2002).
The relationship between R&D spillovers and R&D cooperation, as well as the
potentially different determinants of alternative types of cooperation, have remained
largely unexplored in empirical work. Empirical work on R&D cooperation
distinguishing between the types of cooperation partner has often singled out specific
types of partnerships, not taking into account the simultaneity among different types
of cooperation. Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) analyzed the impact of spillovers on
cooperation but could only distinguish between research institutes and vertically
related partners. They found that higher incoming public spillovers (knowledge
available from public sources) positively affect the probability of cooperating with
research institutes and universities. Greater appropriability of results of the innovation
process (lower outgoing spillovers) increased the probability of cooperating with
customers or suppliers, but was unrelated to cooperative agreements with research
institutes. Kaiser (2002) applied a nested logit framework to analyze firms’ R&D
cooperation in the German service sector, distinguishing between the decision whether
or not to cooperate and the decision which type of cooperation to choose. Here a
distinction could only be made between vertical cooperation and a mixed category of
university and competitor cooperation. The cooperation model had weak explanatory
power and neither measures of spillovers nor variables proxying the research base of
the firm were found to have a statistically significant impact.
Tether (2002), using UK CIS data, investigated the patterns of cooperation
between innovating firms and different potential collaboration partners in a series of
independent logistic regressions. He found firm size to be most influential in
cooperation with suppliers and universities, but less so for cooperation with
customers. Engagement in own R&D had a clear positive effect on all types of
cooperation. Leiponen (2001) used a classification into four types of cooperation:
competitors, suppliers, customers, and universities. The probit results for cooperation
suggested that R&D intensity, firm size and membership of a larger group generally
had positive impacts on the four types of cooperation. The results also showed higher
probabilities of cooperation with universities (customers) in industries where spillovers
from universities (customers) were important, but generally lower probabilities in3 This parallels the argument in Veugelers (1997) for including a permanent R&D variable as facilitator of
appropriation of external knowledge.
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result is consistent with the notion that in dsupplier dominatedT industries (Pavitt, 1984),
firms are more dependent on technological development coming from their suppliers and
are less likely to engage in major product innovations, focusing on incremental process
improvements requiring little formal collaboration. The analysis did not include firm-
specific data on the importance of incoming spillovers.3. Empirical model, data, and estimation method
This paper contributes to the growing empirical literature on R&D cooperation by
estimating a multivariate probit model that jointly determines the decision to engage in
four types of R&D cooperation: competitor, customer, supplier and (research) institutional
R&D partnerships. While the nested logit approach used in previous work (Kaiser, 2002)
does not account for the fact that firms can engage simultaneously in multiple cooperation
agreements, the multivariate probit specification allows for systematic correlations
between choices for the different cooperation types. Such correlations may be due to
complementarities (positive correlation) or substitutabilities (negative correlation) between
different cooperation types, e.g. the benefit of horizontal cooperation may be larger if the
firm also cooperates with universities or research institutes. Positive correlation also arises
if there are unobservable firm-specific characteristics that affect several cooperation
decisions but that are not easily captured by measurable proxies, such as the stock of tacit
knowledge. The multivariate probit model takes these correlations into account, although
it is not able to distinguish between the two sources of correlation. If correlation exists, the
estimates of separate (probit) equations of the cooperation decisions are inefficient.
Our panel dataset is constructed from two consecutive CIS surveys performed by
Statistics Netherlands in 1996 and 1998, which allows us to take past values of
independent variables (in 1996) to explain the existence of R&D cooperation in 1997–
1998. This setup reduces simultaneity bias inherent to cross section analysis in a single
year. According to the theoretical IO literature, the two main explanatory variables that are
most likely to be simultaneously determined with the cooperation decision are incoming
spillovers and R&D intensity: R&D investments may increase if cooperation makes own
R&D activities more effective, and incoming spillovers are likely to increase through
cooperation if only because of information sharing among partners. In our model setup
using 2-year lagged variables such bias will be reduced, but it will not be completely
eliminated. If R&D partnerships last longer than 2–3 years, the R&D intensity and the
importance of incoming spillovers in 1996 are still partly affected by those R&D
partnerships that were formed in or before 1996 and still in existence in 1998. In order to
further reduce such potential simultaneity bias we follow two routes. First, we correct the
spillover measures for systematic impacts of past or existing cooperation. The 1996
spillover measures are also affected by purposeful informational exchanges in past R&D4 Fontana et al. (2004) find that in addition to size and R&D intensity, firm openness to the external
environment (measured as reliance on publications for acquiring knowledge) affects the probability, but not the
level, of cooperation with universities.
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the corresponding cooperation variables in 1996 and a set of industry dummies. The
residuals of these equations are then included as spillovers that are not due to past
cooperation. Secondly, we examine the determinants of cooperation among a sub-sample
of firms lacking any cooperative agreements in 1996. This model of new cooperation
allows us to test for the robustness of the impact of 1996 R&D intensity and incoming
spillovers on the possible establishment of new R&D partnerships in the 1997–1998
period. Although this approach reduces the potential simultaneity between R&D
(cooperation) and spillovers to a minimum,5 its results need to be interpreted with care.
Restricting the sample to firms without any type of R&D cooperation in 1996 among the
set of innovating firms in 1996 excludes persistently cooperating firms—those firms that
are most likely to engage in R&D partnerships. This selection itself creates a sample
selection bias and reduces the number of observations considerably, which is likely to bias
standard errors upwards. However, if tests on this lower tail of firms inclined to cooperate
replicate the results using the complete sample, we take this as a strong indication of the
robustness of the results.
3.1. Data
The dataset used in this paper contains data at the establishment level (in this paper
referred to as dfirmsT) from the CIS surveys in the Netherlands in 1996 and 1998. To create
a panel data set, the 6315 innovating firms in the 1998 CIS survey are matched with the
information on these firms in the 1996 survey: 2353 firms could be linked to the 1996
survey and were classified as innovating firms in that survey.6 Due to missing values for
some of the 1996 explanatory variables the number of observations used in the final
sample is 2149. The distribution of cases for the four equations by the dependent variable
is presented in Table 1. There were 627 firms with R&D cooperation of some type among
the 2149 innovating firms in 1998. Vertical cooperation is most prominent: supplier only
(68), customer only (64), combined (71) or both combined with institutional cooperation
(66). A total of 72 firms have cooperative agreements of all four types. The model
restricting the sample to firms with newly formed cooperative agreements or no R&D
cooperation at all uses a smaller sample of 1484 firms, in which the number of firms with
cooperation in 1998 is substantially reduced to 269.
3.2. Dependent and independent variables
The dependent variables of the model are four dummy variables equal to one if the firm
was engaged in 1998 in an active R&D partnership with competitors, suppliers, clients, or5 The new cooperation model eliminates the potential reverse causality effect from R&D cooperation to
spillovers and R&D, but it does not completely do away with unobserved heterogeneity bias: even among firms
that are not cooperating in 1996, there may be a correlation between the profitability of cooperation, R&D
intensity, and spillovers due to unobserved firm characteristics.
6 Information on explanatory variables is only available in the survey if firms are classified as innovating
firms. Since we did not correct for a possible sample selection bias on innovating firms, the results need to be
interpreted as applicable to innovation active firms only.
Table 1
Distribution of cooperation cases
Cooperation type Number of cases
in full sample
Number of cases in
new cooperation sample
None 1542 1215
Institutional only 39 19
Supplier only 68 38
Supplier and institutional 42 17
Customers only 64 32
Customers and institutional 27 4
Customers and suppliers 71 35
Customers, suppliers and institutional 66 20
Horizontal only 43 26
Horizontal and institutional 31 13
Horizontal and suppliers 8 5
Horizontal, suppliers, institutional 17 4
Horizontal and customers 8 4
Horizontal, customers, institutional 20 5
Horizontal, customers, suppliers 31 17
All four 72 30
Total 2149 1484
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includes a range of explanatory variables supported by our review of theoretical work and
previous empirical models, but remains rather explorative given the lack of straightforward
theoretical predictions available. Since it is our interest to explore the varying determinants
of R&D cooperation between the types, we include each explanatory variable in all four
equations to test whether some variable impacts cooperation of one type but not another.
The descriptive statistics for the samples are presented in Table 2. A detailed description of
the variables is provided in Appendix A and a correlation table in Appendix D.
We include firm-specific and type-specific direct measures of the importance of
incoming spillovers.7 The firms are asked in the CIS survey to rate the importance of
various external sources of information for the firm’s innovation activities. We include the
scores of importance of information from competitors, suppliers, customers, and the
average of scores of information from universities and research institutions (institutional
incoming spillovers). Our prediction is that R&D cooperation of a given type is more
likely if incoming spillovers coming from the potential partners are more important. As
noted supra, we estimate the impact of exogenous spillovers, i.e. not due to purposeful
informational exchanges that arise through past cooperation. The adjusted spillovers are
the residuals obtained from auxiliary regressions of the spillover variables in 1994–1996
on the corresponding cooperation variable and the set of industry dummies.8 In addition,7 Several alternative indirect measures of spillovers have been used in previous empirical work, e.g. based on
uncentered correlation (Jaffe, 1986; Adams, 1990), Euclidean distance, and geographic distance. According to a
comparative study of various spillover measures by Kaiser (2002) both uncentered correlation and direct
measures (used in our model) appear to capture spillovers quite accurately.
8 The auxiliary results of the spillover variables in 1996 on the corresponding cooperation variable and the set
of industry dummies are presented in Appendix C.
Table 2
Descriptive statistics
Sample
mean
(n=2149)
Mean
non-cooperating
firms (n=1542)
Mean
cooperating
firms
(n=607)
Sample
mean
(n=1484)
Mean
non-cooperating
firms
(n=1215)
Sample
mean
(n=269)
Full sample New cooperation sample
Competitor incoming spillovers 1.108 1.071 1.203 1.025 1.022 1.037
Customer incoming spillovers 1.358 1.316 1.247 1.244 1.239 1.268
Supplier incoming spillovers 1.179 1.152 1.247 1.135 1.117 1.219
Institutional
incoming spillovers
0.444 0.361 0.655 0.341 0.314 0.462
Public incoming spillovers 0.631 0.584 0.760 0.556 0.544 0.611
Industry outgoing spillovers 0.711 0.704 0.729 0.705 0.703 0.714
R&D intensity 0.029 0.025 0.039 0.024 0.023 0.028
R&D intensity squared 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.003
Firm size 4.459 4.307 4.841 4.273 4.203 4.569
Industry average
innovative firm size
0.080 0.077 0.088 0.076 0.075 0.079
Organizational
capability constraint
0.042 0.032 0.067 0.033 0.030 0.050
Cost constraint 0.061 0.054 0.080 0.047 0.048 0.045
Risk constraint 0.101 0.081 0.151 0.075 0.069 0.100
Speed of
technological change
0.501 0.491 0.526 0.495 0.493 0.506
Service dummy 0.350 0.359 0.328 0.351 0.344 0.383
Internal knowledge flows 0.539 0.564 0.474 0.576 0.592 0.505
Part of a domestic group 0.471 0.446 0.537 0.438 0.431 0.468
Foreign multinational 0.280 0.274 0.294 0.275 0.273 0.283
R&D subsidy 0.434 0.377 0.578 0.356 0.342 0.416
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including a measure of the importance of spillovers stemming from public sources (public
incoming spillovers): the average of scores of the importance of patents, databases, trade
literature and fairs.9
A shortcoming of the Dutch version of the CIS questionnaire is the lack of a question to
construct a measure of firm-specific outgoing spillovers or appropriability. Instead, we
proxy outgoing spillovers through an industry level variable, taking the average of
horizontal spillovers of firms in the same industry (cf. Leiponen, 2001). The variable
industry outgoing spillovers is constructed at the two-digit industry level and measures the
mean of average scores of information obtained from competitors and patents reported by9 The four spillover sources included in the model identify directly the source of the information in line with
theoretical models and identify most relevant potential sources of information, regardless of the channel of
information transfer. The public spillover measure, on the other hand, identifies the channel of the spillover
(databases, trade fairs, patents) rather than the source and is likely to overlap with the direct measures (if
information from competitors is important, it may reach the firm through patents or trade shows). Inclusion
nevertheless controls for spillovers that may affect cooperation but are not covered by the direct source specific
measures.
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important information from competitors and through published patents (filed among others
by competitors), appropriability conditions in the industry are weak and this may
negatively affect the propensity to cooperate. Industry outgoing spillovers is expected to
impact horizontal cooperation negatively since it measures spillovers to same-industry
competitors.
We include R&D intensity and R&D intensity squared, allowing for a non-linear
impact of R&D (measured as the number of R&D personnel over total personnel) as
explanatory variables. Increasing levels of R&D intensity up to a point will be closely
correlated with absorptive capacity. Further increases may be less effective in expanding
absorptive capacity due to diminishing scale economies or may be associated with the
conduct of idiosyncratic in-house R&D efforts. Hence, we expect a concave relationship,
with the marginal effect of R&D intensity declining. Following previous theoretical and
empirical work, we also expect the relationship between R&D intensity and R&D
cooperation to differ depending on the type of cooperation partner. In case of horizontal
cooperation, the positive relationship is predicted to be weaker than in case of vertical or
institutional cooperation. A large R&D base is likely to be associated with stronger
proprietary knowledge and greater risks for the firm of leakage of information in
cooperation with competitors. This risk is less important in case of cooperation with
research institutes and suppliers and customers.
In line with the existing literature, we also include firm size (the logarithm of the
number of the firm’s employees) as an explanatory variable. We expect that the larger
the firm, ceteris paribus, the more likely it is that it engages in R&D cooperation. For
any given level of R&D intensity, larger firms perform more R&D and are more
likely to possess the necessary absorptive capacity to benefit from R&D cooperation.
Larger firms are also more likely to be engaged in multiple technologies that may
require various R&D partnerships. The largest absorptive capacity and R&D intensity
is likely to be required to absorb scientific knowledge stemming from universities
(Leiponen, 2001).
The propensity to engage in cooperation is also affected by the presence or absence of
partner firms with complementary resources in R&D, and the ease with which suitable
partners can be located. Both are likely to be related to the presence of large innovating
firms in the industry. We aim to control for this influence in case of horizontal cooperation
by including the variable industry average innovative firm size (mean of turnover of all
innovating firms in the two-digit industry). We expect a positive impact, but only on
horizontal cooperation.10
We include three firm-specific measures that aim to capture factors hampering the
innovation process of the firm, potentially pushing the firm to search for cooperation
partners. This follows the perspective of the management literature on R&D alliances on10 The average size of innovative firms in the industry is correlated with market concentration, such that its
impact may also pick up an effect of industry concentration on cooperation (see e.g. Katsoulacos and Ulph (1998)
on the potential anti-competitive effects of research joint-ventures). However, including a C4 concentration ratio
in the model in addition to the innovative firm size variable did not change the latter’s significance while the
impact of the C4 variable was not significantly different from zero for any of the cooperation types.
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lack of financial resources or high costs of new innovation projects. Risk constraint
captures bottlenecks caused by financial uncertainty (profitability) or uncertain market
conditions. Organizational capability constraint is an average of ranked scores of the
bottlenecks that relate to the firm’s shortage of (R&D) personnel, lack of knowledge,
and organizational rigidity that cause the delay or abandonment of new innovation
projects or the failure to start these. These constraints are expected to provide an
incentive for firms to cooperate to reduce the costs, risks, and organizational constraints
of R&D.
In case of rapid technological developments it is likely that firms want to be active in
multiple technological trajectories which buys them options to expand in the technology
directions that eventually prevails (e.g. Tyler and Steensma, 1995). Such rapid
technological developments are most likely to be a feature of dscience basedT industries
characterized by strong technological opportunities and relying on scientific develop-
ments in scientific institutions (Leiponen, 2001; Klevorick et al., 1995; Pavitt, 1984). To
proxy for the speed of technological change we take the ratio of the number of firms in
the two-digit industry that reported that they had introduced products new to the industry
to the number of firms that did not introduce new products, weighted by firm size. We
expect that firms operating in industries characterized by rapid introduction of
completely new products have a higher incentive to engage in cooperation, but
primarily with research institutions. One problem with this measure is that the question
on new products may not adequately pick up technological change in the services sector.
To get an unbiased impact of speed of technological change we include a service
dummy. If service sectors are more technologically active than the speed of technological
change proxy suggests, the service dummy will have a positive sign correcting for this
bias in the variable. Naturally, the service dummy in addition will pick up any
systematic differences in cooperation between manufacturing and service sectors beyond
this bias.11
We also control for the relative importance of information used in the innovation
process coming from other establishments that are part of the same firm group. Internal
knowledge flows is the ratio of the score on the importance of information from other firms
within the group to the importance of external spillovers (sum of scores of all external
sources of information). We expect a negative impact on cooperation, as firms that rely
more on internally generated know-how, perhaps because of unique innovation processes
or technologies, are less likely to see benefit in cooperation with external partners. Table 111 One may expect more differences between sectors in the propensity to cooperate due to the divergent
technological trajectories (e.g. Pavitt, 1984; Leiponen, 2001). We ran separate models for manufacturing and
services firms only but found remarkably little differences in explanatory factors. To check the consistency of the
estimation results further, we estimated an alternative model including a full set of industry dummies. Since
performing this test within the multivariate probit framework (a four-equation model with 17 dummies) is
exceedingly burdensome computationally, we could only run tests for the individual probit equations. In three out
of four cases (the exception was supplier cooperation), the LR test did not reject the industry variable model (the
LR tests were 17.6, 27.6, 20.1 and 12.2 for competitor, supplier, customer and institutional cooperation,
respectively). With the exception of a higher estimated standard error for supplier spillovers, the spillover and
R&D variables remained robust. We therefore present the more informative industry variable model.
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cooperating firms than for non-cooperating firms, while the means for the incoming
spillover variables are higher for cooperating firms.
We include a dummy for firms that are part of a domestic group. It takes the value 1 if
an establishment is part of a larger firm grouping. Firms that are part of a larger group may
draw on group financial and technological resources that make them more attractive as
cooperation partners, but at the same time such firms may have fewer incentives to
cooperate with outside partners.12 In addition, we include a dummy variable multinational
firm, taking the value 1 if the headquarters of the group to which the firm belongs is
located outside the Netherlands.13
Finally, we control for the possible role of R&D subsidies, by including a dummy
taking the value one if the firm stated that it received an R&D subsidy. On the one hand,
R&D subsidies can moderate financial bottlenecks for the firm’s R&D activities and
hence reduce the need to cooperate to share costs. On the other hand, given that a variety
of R&D national and European subsidy schemes are aimed particularly at promoting
R&D cooperation, the availability of R&D subsidies may make the difference in
motivating firms to establish R&D partnerships. These schemes often target pre-
competitive and basic R&D cooperation (e.g. with universities) but are less often aimed at
R&D partnerships with competing firms. However, we cannot measure the availability of
subsidy schemes but only the actual receipt of subsidies by the firms. If indeed R&D
subsidies are conditional on cooperation, there will be a strong positive correlation
between subsidies and cooperation but this is due to a simultaneous relationship between
the two rather than a causal effect of subsidies. By comparing results of the full model
with results of the new cooperation model we will be able to further examine the different
effects of subsidies.
3.3. Model and estimation method
Our model consists of four binary choice equations. These choices are for horizontal
(competitors), customer, supplier and institutional (universities, research centers)
cooperation, respectively. We have four binary dependent variables y1, y2, y3 and y4 where
yi;k ¼ 1 if xi;kbk þ xi;kN00 otherwise; k ¼ 1; N ; 4; i ¼ 1; N ;N

and (x1x2x3x4)~N (0, A) where A is the covariance matrix of the error terms. The error
terms are likely to be correlated if only because of omitted variables in these choice
processes. If one does not take this into account, for example with four separate probit12 Note that the internal spillover variable already corrects for a potential greater inclination towards intra-
group rather than external R&D cooperation for firms.
13 A sizeable proportion (27%) of the establishments are owned by foreign multinationals. The dependent
variable includes a limited number of international R&D partnerships. We also ran the models limiting the
analysis of R&D cooperation to domestic cooperation. As expected, we found a stronger negative impact of the
multinational firm dummy, but no important changes in the overall results.
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decisions we employ a multivariate limited dependent variable (multivariate probit) model.
The computation of the maximum likelihood function based on a multivariate normal
distribution requires multidimensional integration. Simulation methods have been proposed
(see Train, 2002, chapter 5) to approximate such a function. The GHK simulator (Geweke et
al., 1997; Hajivassiliou et al., 1996) has been a particularly popular choice14. We will follow
the GHK simulator approach and choose a simulated maximum likelihood estimator that
also offers possibilities of cross-equation tests and restrictions in parameters.154. Empirical results
Table 3 reports the results of the multivariate probit model for the complete sample of
2149 observations. First of all, we note that the correlation coefficients of the error terms
in the multivariate probit are positive, ranging from 0.636 to 0.834, and highly
significant.16 This supports the notion of interdependence between the different
cooperation decisions, which may be due to complementarity in R&D cooperation
strategies but also to omitted firm-specific factors affecting all types of cooperation. A
second finding is that the estimated coefficients differ substantially across the equations,
indicating the appropriateness of differentiating between cooperation types. In order to
formally test this, we estimated a constrained specification with all slope coefficients
forced to be equal. The likelihood ratio test statistic was 411.57 (76 degrees of freedom),
decisively rejecting the null hypothesis of equal slope coefficients. This result strongly
indicates the heterogeneity in cooperation strategies and, consequently, the unsuitability of
aggregating them into one cooperation variable (cf. Fritsch and Lukas, 2001; Janz et al.,
2003).
The hypothesis that source-specific incoming spillovers positively affect the probability
of cooperation is confirmed. All spillover variables have significantly positive impacts on
the respective cooperation type. The results suggest that firms tend to gravitate to the
cooperation type that has the potentially highest value in terms of incoming knowledge.
Customer and supplier incoming spillovers are significant the 5% level, while competitor
incoming spillovers is significant at the 10% level (two-sided), but clearly smaller in
impact. This finding is consistent with the theoretical literature on R&D cooperation which
predict a weaker relationship between spillover levels and cooperation for competing firms14 Another possibility is to apply GMM along the lines of the estimator proposed by Bertschek and Lechner
(1998). This estimator is shown to have good small sample properties and to have limited efficiency loss
compared to maximum likelihood. Greene (2004), using the same data as Bertschek and Lechner (1998), shows
that maximum likelihood estimates using the GHK simulator are very close to GMM estimates.
15 The results are obtained with a Stata routine due to Cappellari and Jenkins (2003) and are based on 200
random draws. Hajivassiliou and Ruud (1994) prove that under regularity conditions the simulated maximum
likelihood estimator is consistent when both the number of draws and observations goes to infinity. Gourieroux
and Monfort (1996) show that it has the same limiting distribution as the (infeasible) maximum likelihood
estimator if in addition the ratio of the square root of the number of observations over the number of draws
approaches zero.
16 For comparison we also report the results when using four independent univariate probits in Appendix B.1.
Table 3
Results of multivariate probit analysis of R&D cooperation
Competitor
cooperation
Customer
cooperation
Supplier
cooperation
Institutional
cooperation
res. Competitor
incoming spillovers
0.079 (0.047)* 0.032 (0.042) 0.032 (0.042) 0.007 (0.046)
res. Customer
incoming spillovers
0.015 (0.044) 0.209 (0.039)*** 0.007 (0.039) 0.000 (0.043)
res. Supplier
incoming spillovers
0.057 (0.046) 0.030 (0.041) 0.239 (0.040)*** 0.051 (0.045)
res. Institutional
incoming spillovers
0.367 (0.070)*** 0.223 (0.064)*** 0.211 (0.065)*** 0.722 (0.065)***
Public incoming spillovers 0.010 (0.076) 0.000 (0.069) 0.013 (0.069) 0.104 (0.073)
Industry outgoing spillovers 0.476 (0.305) 0.402 (0.285) 0.007 (0.281) 0.199 (0.301)
R&D intensity 2.117 (1.649) 4.179 (1.530)*** 3.219 (1.606)** 4.588 (1.599)***
R&D intensity squared 3.860 (5.108) 12.440 (5.159)** 11.729 (5.669)** 11.714 (5.229)**
Firm size 0.145 (0.031)*** 0.137 (0.029)*** 0.153 (0.029)*** 0.215 (0.032)***
Industry average
innovative firm size
1.070 (0.394)*** 0.299 (0.409) 0.372 (0.387) 0.778 (0.420)*
Organizational
capability constraint
0.163 (0.259) 0.103 (0.222) 0.730 (0.214)*** 0.428 (0.228)*
Cost constraint 0.171 (0.341) 0.247 (0.304) 0.525 (0.314)* 0.683 (0.324)**
Risk constraint 0.351 (0.153)** 0.188 (0.139) 0.328 (0.138)** 0.060 (0.150)
Speed of
technological change
0.547 (0.242)** 0.605 (0.227)*** 0.169 (0.224) 1.067 (0.251)***
Service dummy 0.238 (0.093)** 0.187 (0.086)** 0.095 (0.086) 0.031 (0.094)
Internal knowledge flows 0.023 (0.070) 0.031 (0.066) 0.156 (0.071)** 0.109 (0.077)
Part of a domestic group 0.034 (0.080) 0.144 (0.072)** 0.192 (0.072)*** 0.048 (0.078)
Foreign multinational 0.231 (0.092)** 0.033 (0.079) 0.030 (0.078) 0.084 (0.086)
R&D subsidy 0.021 (0.087) 0.174 (0.078)** 0.220 (0.078)*** 0.236 (0.083)***
Constant 2.090 (0.264)*** 2.584 (0.250)*** 2.049 (0.240)*** 2.949 (0.271)***
Rho1 Rho2 Rho3
Rho/2 0.649 (0.035)***
Rho/3 0.636 (0.036)*** 0.834 (0.020)***
Rho/4 0.744 (0.031)*** 0.735 (0.029)*** 0.784 (0.026)***
Observations 2149
LL 2536.12
Wald v2 (76) 521.67
LL0 (10)
a 2843.826
LR v2 (76)b 615.41
Likelihood ratio test of rho21 = rho31 = rho41 =rho32 =rho42 = rho43 =0: v2(6) = 1234, ProbNv2 = 0.0000.
Standard errors in parentheses.
a Denotes log-likelihood value (df) of the bnaRveQ model, containing only the intercepts.
b LR test is between the full model and the bnaRveQ model.
* Significant at 10%.
** Significant at 5%.
*** Significant at 1%.
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when incoming and outgoing spillovers are not separately identified. We may measure this
weaker impact on competitor cooperation because the model may not sufficiently correct
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and strongly significant effect in all four cooperation equations, and, as expected, the
largest impact on institutional cooperation. The impact on vertical (both customer and
supplier) cooperation and horizontal cooperation suggests that institutional incoming
spillovers are more generic in nature, improving the general effectiveness of the firm’s
R&D activities and stimulating vertical and horizontal cooperation as well. This is
consistent with the notion that for firms for which science is more important as a source of
knowledge, there exist greater technological opportunities, enhancing the effectiveness of
various innovation strategies (Klevorick et al., 1995; Leiponen, 2001). Also, the
importance of this type of incoming spillovers may reflect that the firms are engaged in
basic R&D, such that information sharing within R&D cooperation is more effective
(Katsoulacos and Ulph, 1998).
Industry outgoing spillovers has the expected negative impact on horizontal
cooperation, but it just fails to reach conventional two-sided significance levels.18 With
the source-specific spillovers included, there is no additional impact discernable of
incoming public spillovers, perhaps because these measure partly the channel through
which spillovers of various sources reach the firm and do not constitute new sources of
information.
The effect of R&D intensity on the probability of cooperation is positive and concave
as expected, with the linear term positive and the quadratic term negative, but there are
differences between cooperation types. A robust concave relationship is estimated for
supplier, customer, and institutional cooperation, with the maximum impact reached at
rather high levels between 0.137 and 0.196 (percentage of R&D employees over total
employees). For competitor cooperation both terms are insignificant with the coefficients
substantially smaller than in the other cooperation equations. On the other hand, the F-test
on removing both R&D intensity terms from the horizontal cooperation equation is
rejected and a specification in which the quadratic term is dropped renders a significantly
positive coefficient on the linear term (not reported here). Overall, these findings suggest a
positive but weaker impact of R&D intensity on competitor cooperation. This is consistent
with the notion that R&D-intensive firms in horizontal partnerships also face greater risks
of leakage of their proprietary knowledge, which may outweigh the potential benefits of
knowledge transfers due to cooperation.
Firm size is positive and significant in each of the equations, with the coefficient
highest in case of institutional cooperation. Larger firms are more likely to have the critical
size and absorptive capacity required to engage in R&D cooperation, and this effect is
strongest for cooperation with universities. The industry average innovative firm size
variable is positive and significant in the horizontal cooperation equation as hypothesized,
and also marginally (10%) in the institutional cooperation equation. The availability of18 The coefficient does reach significance in the univariate probit model reported in Appendix B.1.
17 The outgoing spillovers variable is measured at the industry level and hence not fully representative for the
specific appropriability conditions for individual firms within the industry. An alternative explanation may be that
firms rating horizontal incoming spillovers as important are more likely to be technology followers rather than
leaders and are as such less attractive R&D partners.
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R&D.19
The organizational capability constraint is significantly positive in the supplier and
institutional cooperation equations. The risk constraint variable is significant and positive
for both the competitor and supplier cooperation decisions, while the cost constraint
variable has a positive and significant impact on institutional cooperation but a negative
impact on supplier cooperation. Overall, the results confirm that the various types of
constraints induce R&D cooperation strategies, while commercial risk sharing and access
to complementary knowledge when faced with internal resource constraints appear to be
the most consistent motivation for firms to seek R&D partners. The various constraints do
not affect customer cooperation, perhaps because the goal of this type of cooperation is
often to improve market acceptance or design features of new products, rather than to
alleviate internal constraints.
The speed of technological change variable is found to have a positive and significant
effect for the horizontal, customer and institutional cooperation decisions, but not for
supplier cooperation. Firms in industries with shorter product life cycles and rapid
technological developments are more inclined to cooperate with rivals or/and customers or
to cooperate in generic technologies with research institutes and universities. The largest
impact is estimated for institutional cooperation, consistent with the notion that for firms
facing rapid technological developments and greater technological opportunities, collab-
oration with universities and research institutes is essential for innovative success. The speed
of technological change variable may have been less adequately measured for the service
industries and, therefore, we incorporated a service dummy expecting a positive impact if
this dummy corrects for under-reported speed of technological change. The service dummy
has the expected positive effect in the customer and competitor cooperation equations.
The effect of the internal knowledge flow variable is negative as expected in each of the
four equations, but is only significant in the supplier equation. Firms that are part of a
group are more likely to cooperate with suppliers and customers, but not with competitors
or research institutions. The dummy for a multinational firm is negative and significant in
the competitor cooperation equation: affiliates of multinationals are less likely to cooperate
with local rivals, but are not less inclined to engage in vertical or institutional types of
cooperation. Finally, the R&D subsidy variable has a positive and significant impact on
vertical (both customers and suppliers) and institutional cooperation, which may suggest
that subsidies promote pro-competitive R&D partnerships.
4.1. New R&D cooperation
The multivariate probit results obtained on the sub-sample of firms not (yet)
cooperating in 1996 are presented in Table 4.20 The results are broadly in line with19 Since the Netherlands is a small country, the majority of potential partners is in geographical proximity:
The large majority of firms is located in a circle of less than 100 km around Utrecht. Perhaps in industries in
which the average innovative firm size is larger, there is also a greater probability of R&D consortia involving
large firms and universities.
20 For comparison, the results from the four binary probits on this sample are reported in Appendix B.2.
Table 4
Multivariate probit results for new R&D cooperation
Competitor
cooperation
Customer
cooperation
Supplier
cooperation
Institutional
cooperation
res. Competitor
incoming spillovers
0.105 (0.062)* 0.033 (0.057) 0.024 (0.055) 0.015 (0.064)
res. Customer
incoming spillovers
0.031 (0.058) 0.181 (0.052)*** 0.012 (0.050) 0.032 (0.058)
res. Supplier
incoming spillovers
0.033 (0.061) 0.018 (0.056) 0.212 (0.053)*** 0.009 (0.062)
res. Institutional
incoming spillovers
0.266 (0.100)*** 0.186 (0.090)** 0.128 (0.089) 0.671 (0.088)***
Public incoming spillovers 0.192 (0.117) 0.131 (0.099) 0.040 (0.095) 0.116 (0.110)
Industry outgoing spillovers 0.039 (0.428) 0.457 (0.414) 0.154 (0.404) 0.132 (0.431)
R&D intensity 2.471 (2.736) 3.874 (2.247)* 5.865 (2.492)** 7.299 (2.882)**
R&D intensity squared 8.693 (9.920) 10.665 (7.684) 21.333 (10.376)** 29.678 (12.981)**
Firm size 0.104 (0.046)** 0.180 (0.043)*** 0.174 (0.042)*** 0.195 (0.049)***
Industry average
innovative firm size
0.913 (0.546)* 0.694 (0.695) 0.718 (0.669) 0.495 (0.661)
Organizational
capability constraint
0.591 (0.430) 0.010 (0.325) 0.802 (0.296)*** 0.570 (0.325)*
Cost constraint 0.405 (0.572) 0.501 (0.500) 0.819 (0.502) 0.723 (0.569)
Risk constraint 0.400 (0.236)* 0.194 (0.216) 0.253 (0.201) 0.136 (0.244)
Speed of
technological change
0.044 (0.336) 0.548 (0.307)* 0.213 (0.296) 1.213 (0.351)***
Service dummy 0.179 (0.125) 0.283 (0.114)** 0.279 (0.111)** 0.113 (0.129)
Internal knowledge flows 0.052 (0.091) 0.080 (0.087) 0.211 (0.096)** 0.355 (0.130)***
Part of a domestic group 0.202 (0.108)* 0.086 (0.097) 0.138 (0.095) 0.032 (0.107)
Foreign multinational 0.233 (0.127)* 0.071 (0.107) 0.091 (0.105) 0.074 (0.118)
R&D subsidy 0.184 (0.123) 0.057 (0.106) 0.016 (0.105) 0.051 (0.118)
Constant 1.789 (0.346)*** 2.745 (0.336)*** 2.303 (0.320)*** 3.010
Rho1 Rho2 Rho3
Rho/2 0.728 (0.043)***
Rho/3 0.745 (0.040)*** 0.890 (0.022)***
Rho/4 0.834 (0.034)*** 0.747 (0.042)*** 0.811 (0.033)***
Observations 1484
LL 1234.62
Wald v2 (76) 235.03
LL0 (10)
a 1379.33
LR v2 (76)b 289.40
Likelihood ratio test of rho21 = rho31 = rho41 = rho32 = rho42 = rho43 = 0: v2(6) = 735.639, ProbNv2 = 0.0000.
Standard errors in parentheses.
a Denotes log-likelihood value (df) of the bnaRveQ model, containing only the intercepts.
b LR test is between the full model and the bnaRveQ model.
* Significant at 10%.
** Significant at 5%.
*** Significant at 1%.
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is likely to be due to a smaller sample (1488 observations) and the exclusion of
consistently cooperating firms resulting in a much smaller percentage of cooperating firms.
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while only the dgenericT effect of institutional spillovers on supplier cooperation appears
less robust. The results for R&D intensity are by and large replicated, with the exception
that the quadratic term for customer cooperation falls just below conventional significance
levels. Overall, the findings indicate the robustness of results in the presence of potential
simultaneity bias.
A number of differences are also worth noting in the new cooperation equations.
Firms that rate internal knowledge flows as relatively important appear less likely to
form new supplier and research institutional links, an effect that was not identified
significantly in the full sample model. The average size of innovative firm maintains
its expected positive impact on competitor cooperation, while the positive impact on
institutional cooperation disappears. The speed of technological change variable looses
its significance in the competitor cooperation equation but remains robust in the
institutional and customer cooperation equations. Group membership now loses its
positive effect on cooperation and instead has a significantly negative impact on
competitor cooperation. The greatest change in the results compared those for the full
sample model occurs for the R&D subsidy dummy, as expected. For the new
cooperation sample, the coefficient of the R&D subsidy dummy no longer includes the
effects of R&D subsidies that were granted conditional on R&D cooperation. Hence
the results cannot be affected by simultaneity between subsidies and cooperation but
reflect the effect of existing R&D subsidies on new R&D cooperation. While the
estimated effect in the full model was significantly positive in supplier, customer, and
institutional cooperation, these effects are now insignificant. The results suggest that
the positive impact found for the full sample may indeed be biased upward by
simultaneity between cooperation and subsidies.215. Conclusion
This paper has explored the heterogeneity in the determinants of firms’ decisions
to engage in vertical (suppliers, customers), horizontal (competitors) and research
institutional (universities and research labs) R&D cooperation. We took into account
a broad set of determinants but paid particular attention to the effects of different
types of spillovers, a central focus in the industrial organization literature on R&D
cooperation. We limited potential problems of simultaneity bias between cooperation
and its determinants (notably R&D intensity and incoming spillovers) by utilizing a
two-period dataset on innovating firms, which allowed us to employ lagged variables.21 Such bias may be caused by a positive impact of R&D subsidies in 1996 effectively allocated to joint R&D
projects set up around that time but still in existence in 1998. The individual probit result for the impact of R&D
subsidies on horizontal cooperation, as reported in Appendix B.2, is even found to be significantly negative. This
could point to an alternative impact of subsidies in alleviating financial constraints: R&D subsidies moderate
financial bottlenecks for the firm’s R&D activities and hence reduce the need to cooperate. Non-cooperating firms
that have received subsidies would be more likely to find it optimal to rely on internal R&D efforts instead of
sharing funds and research results with competitors.
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period, further minimizing potential simultaneity problems. We used a multivariate
probit model to reflect that firms consider simultaneously the decisions to cooperate
with various partners. We found significantly positive correlations between the
equations, which might indicate that the various cooperation decisions tend to be
viewed by the firms as complementary rather than substitutes, but could also be due
unobserved firm heterogeneity.
Our results confirmed that incoming source-specific spillovers are an important
determinant of R&D cooperation: cooperation with a type or partner is significantly
more likely if incoming spillovers from that type of partner are more important for the
firms’ innovation process. We found a smaller impact of competitor spillovers on
horizontal cooperation, consistent with stylized results from theoretical industrial
organization models of R&D cooperation, where spillover levels have a less
unambiguously positive impact on R&D cooperation with competing firms than on
cooperation with vertically or unrelated firms. Another finding was that incoming
spillovers from universities and research institutes stimulate cooperation of all types,
suggesting that this knowledge is more generic in nature and improves the technological
opportunities and general effectiveness of the firm’s R&D activities and R&D
cooperation strategies.
R&D intensity has a positive impact on vertical and institutional cooperation, with
a decreasing marginal impact for highly R&D intensive firms. A weaker positive
impact was found for horizontal R&D cooperation with competing firms, consistent
with the notion that firms in horizontal partnerships also face greater risks of leakage
of proprietary knowledge. Firm size has a positive impact on all four types of
cooperation, as larger firms are more likely to have the critical size and absorptive
capacity required to engage in R&D cooperation. The largest firms were more likely
to cooperate with universities and research institutes, suggesting that small and
medium sized firms often do not have the critical size to cooperate effectively with
science institutions. Risk and organizational constraints in the firm’s innovation
process generally had a positive impact on R&D cooperation, with the most robust
results for the commercial risk factor being on horizontal cooperation and for
organizational constraints on supplier and institutional cooperation. R&D cooperation
with institutions, customers, and competitors were found to be more likely in case of
a greater speed of technological change in terms of new product introductions in the
industry. Foreign multinationals were found to have a lower propensity to engage in
horizontal cooperation, but were not less inclined to cooperate vertically or with
universities and research institutes. The estimated impact of R&D subsidies proved to
be sample sensitive: received subsidies had a positive effect on R&D cooperation in
the full sample model, but not in the model for new cooperation, suggesting that the
positive impact is not generic but stems from those subsidies that are granted
conditional on cooperation.
The results show that there is merit in disaggregating R&D cooperation by type
of partner and that there are substantial differences in the motives and determinants
of the different types of cooperation. Further empirical work in this area would
greatly benefit from an extension of theoretical models to other types of R&D
R. Belderbos et al. / Int. J. Ind. Organ. 22 (2004) 1237–1263 1257partnerships than horizontal cooperation. High on the agenda of future empirical
work is analysis of potential complementarities between cooperation types, i.e. the
choice of multiple R&D partnerships, and the effects of these on innovative
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this paper was written.Appendix A. Description of variablesVariable name Definition
Competitor incoming spillovers* Importance of competitors as source of knowledge for the firm’s
innovation process.
Customer incoming spillovers* Importance of customers as source of knowledge for the firm’s
innovation process.
Supplier incoming spillovers* Importance of suppliers as source of knowledge for the firm’s
innovation process.
Institutional incoming spillovers* Average of importance of universities, innovation centers, and
research institutions as source of knowledge for the firm’s
innovation process.
Public incoming spillover Average of importance of patents, databases, trade literature and
fairs as source of knowledge for the firm’s innovation process.
Industry outgoing spillovers Mean of scores of importance of information received from
competitors and patents for all firms operating in the
(two-digit) industry.
R&D intensity R&D employees/total employees
R&D intensity squared R&D employees/total employees squared
Firm size Logarithm of number of employees
Industry average innovative firm size Mean of sales by all innovating firms operating in the two-digit
industry.
(continued on next page)
Appendix A (continued)
Variable name Definition
Organizational capability constraint Average of scores on the following responses:
innovation project
not started due to short of staff
not started due short of knowledge
not started due to rigid organization
Risk constraint Average of scores on the following responses:
innovation project
not started due to economic risks
not started due to uncertain markets
Cost constraint Average of scores on the following responses:
innovation project
not started or delayed or
abandoned due to short of financing
not started or delayed or
abandoned due to high costs
Speed of technological change Sum of sales of firms in the two-digit industry that stated that they
had introduced products new to the industry, divided by sum of
sales of all firms in the industry
Service dummy 1 if business unit belongs to the services sector, else 0
Internal knowledge flows Importance of other group firms as source of knowledge for the
firm’s innovation process, divided by the total of importance
scores of all external sources of knowledge
Part of a domestic group 1 if the firm is part of a domestic corporate group, else 0
Foreign multinational 1 if headquarters of the firm is located outside the Netherlands,
else 0
R&D subsidy 1 if firm received subsidy for innovation activities, else 0
All independent variables are derived from the 1996 CIS survey.
* In the full sample analysis, the source-specific incoming spillovers are substituted by the error terms of
regressions of the 1996 spillovers on the 1994–1996 cooperation dummies and the set of industry dummies.
R. Belderbos et al. / Int. J. Ind. Organ. 22 (2004) 1237–12631258Appendix B.1. Individual probit results for the full sampleCompetitor
cooperation
Customer
cooperation
Supplier
cooperation
Institutional
cooperation
res. Competitor
incoming spillovers
0.085 (0.048)* 0.022 (0.043) 0.038 (0.043) 0.020 (0.048)
res. Customer
incoming spillovers
0.022 (0.045) 0.224 (0.040)*** 0.021 (0.039) 0.016 (0.045)
res. Supplier
incoming spillovers
0.055 (0.047) 0.044 (0.042) 0.248 (0.041)*** 0.053 (0.047)
res. Institutional
incoming spillovers
0.375 (0.069)*** 0.227 (0.063)*** 0.221 (0.063)*** 0.722 (0.066)***
Public incoming spillovers 0.001 (0.077) 0.007 (0.069) 0.004 (0.069) 0.091 (0.075)
Industry outgoing spillover 0.557 (0.312)* 0.395 (0.292) 0.105 (0.286) 0.203 (0.309)
R&D intensity 2.184 (1.684) 4.370 (1.578)*** 3.421 (1.690)** 4.684 (1.656)***
R&D intensity squared 4.182 (5.286) 13.289 (5.465)** 12.479 (6.294)** 2.016 (5.488)**
Firm size 0.139 (0.032)*** 0.138 (0.029)*** 0.157 (0.030)*** 0.240 (0.033)***
Cost constraint 0.262 (0.580) 0.291 (0.505) 0.585 (0.509) 0.468 (0.608)
Appendix B1 (continued)
Competitor
cooperation
Customer
cooperation
Supplier
cooperation
Institutional
cooperation
Industry average
innovative firm size
1.004 (0.395)** 0.329 (0.411) 0.323 (0.394) 0.796 (0.417)*
Organizational
capability constraint
0.169 (0.270) 0.008 (0.236) 0.732 (0.224)*** 0.412 (0.242)*
Cost constraint 0.164 (0.350) 0.347 (0.308) 0.427 (0.323) 0.794 (0.334)**
Risk constraint 0.371 (0.156)** 0.207 (0.142) 0.302 (0.143)** 0.050 (0.158)
Speed of
technological change
0.621 (0.246)** 0.612 (0.231)*** 0.147 (0.230) 1.115 (0.265)***
Service dummy 0.217 (0.094)** 0.166 (0.088)* 0.067 (0.088) 0.033 (0.097)
Internal knowledge flows 0.013 (0.069) 0.027 (0.065) 0.127 (0.071)* 0.103 (0.080)
Part of a domestic group 0.053 (0.082) 0.156 (0.073)** 0.190 (0.073)*** 0.058 (0.081)
Foreign multinational 0.241 (0.095)** 0.064 (0.080) 0.011 (0.079) 0.137 (0.090)
R&D subsidy 0.008 (0.089) 0.153 (0.079)* 0.177 (0.079)** 0.201 (0.086)**
Constant 2.004 (0.271)*** 2.585 (0.255)*** 2.119 (0.246)*** 3.044 (0.287)***
Observations 2149 2149 2149 2149
Ll 673.26 876.62 892.62 710.62
v2 115.88 185.95 204.52 366.34
Standard errors in parentheses.
* Significant at 10%.
** significant at 5%.
*** significant at 1%.
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cooperation
Customer
cooperation
Supplier
cooperation
Institutional
cooperation
res. Competitor
incoming spillovers
0.102 (0.064) 0.026 (0.059) 0.022 (0.057) 0.019 (0.069)
res. Customer
incoming spillovers
0.044 (0.059) 0.209 (0.054)*** 0.046 (0.052) 0.002 (0.064)
res. Supplier
incoming spillovers
0.047 (0.064) 0.018 (0.059) 0.223 (0.055)*** 0.010 (0.068)
res. Institutional
incoming spillovers
0.319 (0.097)*** 0.232 (0.089)*** 0.178 (0.088)** 0.694 (0.092)***
Public incoming
spillovers
0.194 (0.119) 0.127 (0.103) 0.014 (0.099) 0.171 (0.119)
Industry outgoing
spillovers
0.099 (0.443) 0.403 (0.438) 0.207 (0.420) 0.023 (0.459)
R&D intensity 3.430 (2.803) 4.115 (2.316)* 6.790 (2.910)** 7.827 (3.085)**
R&D intensity squared 11.218 (10.358) 11.973 (8.070) 28.871 (14.954)* 31.620 (14.419)**
Firm size 0.113 (0.048)** 0.179 (0.044)*** 0.190 (0.043)*** 0.223 (0.052)***
Industry average
innovative firm size
0.821 (0.552) 0.513 (0.720) 0.490 (0.651) 0.774 (0.643)
Organizational
capability constraint
0.730 (0.497) 0.022 (0.357) 0.785 (0.306)** 0.544 (0.369)
Risk constraint 0.454 (0.246)* 0.228 (0.225) 0.233 (0.215) 0.156 (0.275)
(continued on next page)
Appendix B2 (continued)
Competitor
cooperation
Customer
cooperation
Supplier
cooperation
Institutional
cooperation
Speed of technological
change
0.127 (0.350) 0.578 (0.323)* 0.172 (0.312) 1.381 (0.391)***
Service dummy 0.140 (0.130) 0.235 (0.118)** 0.230 (0.115)** 0.044 (0.140)
Internal knowledge flows 0.029 (0.088) 0.052 (0.085) 0.151 (0.095) 0.332 (0.162)**
Part of a domestic group 0.207 (0.113)* 0.113 (0.101) 0.154 (0.098) 0.018 (0.117)
Foreign multinational 0.217 (0.132) 0.106 (0.112) 0.086 (0.108) 0.079 (0.125)
R&D subsidy 0.288 (0.130)** 0.008 (0.109) 0.054 (0.109) 0.150 (0.126)
Constant 1.807 (0.359)*** 2.740 (0.349)*** 2.443 (0.333)*** 3.169 (0.414)***
Observations 1484 1484 1484 1484
Ll 353.19 444.86 473.67 330.73
v2 47.04 68.95 92.61 132.69
Standard errors in parentheses.
* Significant at 10%.
** significant at 5%.
*** significant at 1%.
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incoming spilloversCompetitor
spillovers
Customer
spillovers
Supplier
spillovers
Institutional
spillovers
Competitor cooperation 0.169*** (0.060)
Customer cooperation 0.391*** (0.053)
Supplier cooperation 0.204*** (0.048)
Institutional cooperation 0.393*** (0.033)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.02 0.07 0.03 0.10
Notes to Appendix D:
(1) Competitor incoming spillovers.
(2) Customer incoming spillovers.
(3) Supplier incoming spillovers.
(4) Institutional incoming spillovers.
(5) Public incoming spillovers.
(6) Industry outgoing spillovers.
(7) R&D intensity.
(8) R&D intensity squared.
(9) Firm size.
(10) Industry average innovative firm size.
(11) Organizational cap. Constraint.
(12) Cost constraint.
(13) Risk constraint.
(14) Speed of technological change.
(15) Services.
(16) Internal knowledge flows.
(17) Part of a domestic group.
(18) Foreign Multinational.
(19) R&D Subsidy.
Appendix D. Correlations
(N=1949)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
1 0.3928
2 0.3145 0.2837
3 0.2308 0.1686 0.1694
4 0.1521 0.0614 0.0290 0.1454
5 0.0078 0.0030 0.0004 0.0023 0.1183
6 0.0300 0.0682 0.0495 0.1236 0.1824 0.2616
7 0.0306 0.0475 0.0422 0.1023 0.1033 0.1366 0.8871
8 0.1111 0.0517 0.0217 0.1024 0.1885 0.0250 0.0054 0.0157
9 0.0087 0.0058 0.0051 0.0031 0.0485 0.0854 0.0124 0.0188 0.1574
10 0.0490 0.0257 0.0071 0.0665 0.1115 0.0543 0.0700 0.0373 0.0323 0.0089
11 0.0418 0.0480 0.0241 0.0400 0.1551 0.0988 0.1747 0.1072 0.0348 0.0189 0.3266
12 0.0619 0.0703 0.0303 0.0893 0.1717 0.1018 0.1384 0.0807 0.0894 0.0273 0.3640 0.4617
13 0.0075 0.0022 0.0056 0.0010 0.0840 0.4860 0.2106 0.1339 0.0049 0.2481 0.0450 0.0756 0.0832
14 0.0001 0.0017 0.0068 0.0057 0.0057 0.3719 0.0915 0.0177 0.0132 0.0359 0.0141 0.0563 0.0639 0.5080
15 0.0947 0.0831 0.0931 0.1096 0.3329 0.0458 0.0240 0.0097 0.0492 0.0126 0.0279 0.0020 0.0466 0.0885 0.0801
16 0.0184 0.0172 0.0011 0.0036 0.0899 0.1056 0.0312 0.0005 0.2446 0.0017 0.0002 0.0250 0.0340 0.0023 0.0031 0.0961
17 0.0031 0.0087 0.0353 0.0039 0.0466 0.1498 0.0415 0.0107 0.1627 0.0482 0.0028 0.0237 0.0101 0.0114 0.0303 0.0918 0.3083
18 0.0978 0.0904 0.0319 0.1670 0.1792 0.2868 0.3277 0.1832 0.1723 0.0306 0.1071 0.1884 0.1778 0.2342 0.2773 0.0712 0.1140 0.0202
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